These terms cause problems for actions that purport to constitute implied consent. Consider a vote. While it may seem that someone who votes is expressing, among other things, support for the political system, this is not enough to vote to establish political commitments. To use a Simmons distinction, we can say that voting “involves consent” (Simmons 1979:88-95). It doesn`t make much sense to vote if you don`t support the political system. But it is different to say that the act of voting is actually an approval. Many people are unlikely to vote on the idea that they agree to obey the laws of their country and that if they did not vote, they would have no moral obligation to do so. If voting is to create a moral requirement that corresponds to what is created by a promise, something along those lines should be true. There are similar problems with other measures taken to justify consent. For example, although the oath one takes upon entering the armed forces seems to create moral requirements regarding the content of the oath, it is generally binding only as long as one serves. When you leave the armed forces, these oaths usually expire. With such opinions, we are forced to obey because it is an appropriate expression of emotions that we should feel for a good reason: gratitude to the law for all it gives us, respect for its gullible efforts to guide us, or a sense of belonging to the community.
In the latter case, the relationship cannot only be the subject of the law; it must be a membership of the community of which it is the right (Raz 1979, 250-61). Friendship provides an analogy. People choose their friends, but not to have obligations to them. However, a flourishing friendship comes with obligations. In addition to the known reasons for fulfilling one`s duties of support, honesty, reciprocity, etc., it is plausible to assume that this also expresses loyalty to one`s friends and is known for this, and that it adds additional support to the duties. Similarly, Raz suggests: “A person who identifies with his society and feels like he belongs to it is loyal to his society. Its loyalty can be expressed, inter alia, in compliance with Community law” (1979, 259). This will inevitably be a bit loose – the institutional and bureaucratic structure of the law means that it will usually be an imperfect expression of the society that regulates it. And, as Raz notes, the expressive arguments apply only to those who are actually in this special relationship; They do not demonstrate that it is obligatory to do so, nor that it is obligatory to express one`s loyalty in this way and not in any other way. Moreover, it is not clear why we should even think that obedience is an appropriate expression of this type of relationship. Is this a well-established convention? Is it appropriate in any way from a normative point of view? Loyalty to one`s own friends usually does not appear when one obeys them. Why should loyalty to the community be different? In contrast, Dworkin believes that we generally have “a duty to discharge our responsibilities within the framework of social practices that define groups and assign special responsibilities to members” (Dworkin 1986, 198), provided that group members believe that their obligations are special and personal and result from a gullible interpretation of the same concern for the well-being of all its members.
In truth, however, these conditions are not a matter of the actual feelings and thoughts of the members – they are qualities of interpretation that we would attribute to them well (201). Nevertheless, why do they establish a duty of obedience as opposed to a duty of respectful care or a duty of apology for instances of non-compliance? Admittedly, obedience is not part of Dworkin`s paradigm of “brotherhood” – mutual aid and support are the normal obligations there. In fact, the classic associative model of political authority was not fraternity, but paternity, against which Locke argued so decisively. This is not to deny that we owe something to these decent associations, of which we are non-voluntary members – but we need another argument to determine exactly what it means. There are many ways to argue a moral obligation to obey the law. What is the relationship between them? Some argue that the obligation comes first: “Although the obligation is not a sufficient condition for coercion, it is close to a necessary condition. A State may, in certain circumstances, have good reasons to force those who are not obliged to obey. But no general policy of maintaining the law with steel could be justified if the law were not generally a source of real obligations” (Dworkin 1986, 191). The idea is that simple justice, on the one hand, is not a sufficient reason to force others; There is also a need for a special title, which results from the moral status of the law. (By contrast, for example, Locke`s view is that everyone has “executive power under natural law,” at least outside of political society (§ 13).) First, we must be aware that the emphasis is on a prima facie moral obligation to obey the law – at first glance, we should obey the law, but in some situations we may be morally entitled to break the law. Raz gives the example of stealing medicine for a sick tourist who has no knowledge of English or no right to medical care (2). The assumption is that, in general, we are only talking about legal systems, although, of course, we could have a long debate about what constitutes a just legal system.
Communists and Thatcherists might have a long debate about whether to support a legal system that divides property largely between family ties and allows workers to earn less than the value of their labor! Hopefully it is now clear that this issue will be more important in a generally just legal system, in situations where people feel morally indifferent or torn apart, but the law requires certain actions or non-actions. Does the fact that a law exists tip the scales? In the literature, researchers have attempted to justify political commitments for a variety of reasons. In the liberal tradition, the arguments of voluntary consent are traditionally the most central. Until relatively recently, the history of political engagement was a story of consent (Klosko 2011b). Other approaches discussed in this essay include consequentialist arguments based on the effects of obedience or disobedience, arguments based on the principle of fairness (or fair play) that relate to the receipt of state benefits, and arguments based on a principle of belonging or association and a natural duty of justice. I will examine the strengths and weaknesses of these different approaches and recent developments that have challenged the main features of political commitments as traditionally understood. There is general agreement that there is no absolute or conclusive obligation to comply with the law. Even the author suggests that there is not even a prima facie obligation to obey it. This chapter does not contain any general argument that there is no such obligation to comply with the law; Rather, he hopes that a more indirect approach suggests that duty does not exist. The first section of the chapter deals with the nature of the assertion that one is obliged to obey the law. This chapter also examines whether such an obligation involves moral and prudential considerations. It concludes with a discussion of the role of law in society in a way that explains why a good law should not be expected to lead to an obligation to obey it.
The example of a traffic light described at the beginning of this article is a favorite of legal philosophers. Traffic lights help us coordinate our behaviour on the roads in such a way as to cause as few accidents as possible. The problem of coordinating our conduct does not exist at 3 a.m. because there is no one to fall into. There are also no police officers to catch and punish us, nor anyone else who breaks the law and decides that they also want to stop obeying the law. In short, lighting a red light at 3 a.m. won`t hurt anyone and it certainly won`t trigger a revolution. This shows the difficulty of finding a general moral obligation to obey the law, because so many people would not consider this behavior immoral when we know that the law exists to protect everyone, but there is no one who can be violated. We think beyond the law about its rationale and decide that at 3 a.m. we can make a better decision about whether ignoring traffic lights puts someone at risk. However, if the fact that a law exists makes no difference, if other moral or practical reasons for acting in one way or another do not exist, can we really say that there is a moral obligation to obey the law, even when it comes to face value? On the other hand, is it dangerous, wrong or unfair to say that we are not morally obliged to follow the law simply because it is the law? This is a question that everyone has to decide for themselves, and whatever we want to think, we would say that our true opinion is best shown at 3 a.m.
at an empty intersection. (1) John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge University Press, 1995) (2) Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press, 2011, 2nd ed.) (3) Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Sweet and Maxwell, 2009, 5th ed.) (4) Ibid. The analogy with parenthood originally comes from Plato (5) Raz, ibid. (6) Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2011, 2nd ed.) (7) Raz, ibid. (8) This is a summary of the discussion in Chapters 12 and 13 of The Authority of Law, ibid. (9) See Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (ibid.) in Chapter 11 33 Please note, that I am not claiming that customary law systems always reduce violence or promote justice.
